John Torrey v. New Jersey Department of Law a by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-7-2017 
John Torrey v. New Jersey Department of Law a 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"John Torrey v. New Jersey Department of Law a" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 1151. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/1151 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-2052 
________________ 
 
JOHN O. TORREY, 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
  
STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LAW 
AND PUBLIC SAFETY, Division of Criminal Justice; 
STEPHEN J. TAYLOR, individually, and in his official 
capacity of Director of the Division of Criminal Justice;  
PAUL MORRIS, individually, and in his official capacity as 
the chief of investigations, Division of Criminal Justice; 
STANLEY BEET, individually, and in his official capacity; 
DERMOT P. O’GRADY, Esq. in his individual and his  
official capacity; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1 TO 25, 
individually and in their official capacities 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-01192) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 13, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 7, 2017) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 John Torrey is a former law enforcement officer who was employed by the New 
Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety, Division of Criminal Justice (“DCJ”).  
While there he was the target of an internal investigation involving allegations of sexual 
harassment, hostile work environment, and other misconduct.  Following the 
investigation, he was terminated and began applying for other law enforcement positions, 
including positions at the Mercer County Sheriff’s Office and the Camden County Police 
Department.   
To facilitate routine background checks in connection with his applications, 
Torrey signed and notarized consent forms authorizing the DCJ to share its personnel 
files relating to him, including those produced by the internal investigation.  After 
receiving these forms, the DCJ allowed investigators from both the Mercer and Camden 
County offices to review Torrey’s files.  He was not hired.  
Torrey sued the DCJ and individual, state-employee defendants, alleging a 
deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and defamation, 
false light, and tortious interference with economic advantage under New Jersey law.1  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 The District Court also dismissed Torrey’s New Jersey common law due process claim, 
but he does not challenge that ruling on appeal. 
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The District Court entered summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed his 
claims.  It found that there were no genuine issues of material fact about whether the 
DCJ’s internal files contained false and inaccurate information.  It also concluded that the 
consent forms signed by Torrey were not void as against public policy.  Next, it found no 
evidence the defendants interfered with his prospective economic advantage.  Finally, it 
ruled sua sponte that the State and state-employee defendants were entitled to qualified 
immunity.  As none of the Court’s rulings were erroneous, we affirm.   
For three of Torrey’s four claims, he must produce evidence that the contents of 
the personnel files were both false and made public.  DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 
1267–68 (N.J. 2004) (defamation claims require a “false and defamatory statement” and 
an “unprivileged publication of that statement”); see also Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 
455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (a section 1983 liberty interest in reputation claim 
requires an employer to have “disseminate[d] a false and defamatory impression about 
the employee.”); Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 289, 109 N.J. 282, 293 (N.J.,1988) 
(false light claims require placement “in a false light before the public.”)  The record 
evidence, however, fails to establish either requirement.  To begin, Torrey does not 
provide evidence of falsity.  The District Court found the majority of Torrey’s file was 
undisputedly true, as Torrey himself acknowledged in a formal, recorded interview 
conducted as part of the investigation into the complaints.  During that interview, he 
confirmed making harassing sexual comments, gestures, and contact with female 
subordinates, improperly using confidential funds, and visiting sexually explicit websites 
on his work computer.  Second, Torrey does not provide evidence of unprivileged 
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publication, as there is no evidence that the personnel files were disseminated to parties 
other than Torrey’s prospective employers, who Torrey had authorized to access the files.   
Torrey answers that the consent forms are void as against public policy.  He also 
challenges the District Court’s qualified immunity analysis for the same reason, disputing 
its reliance on the waivers in its reasoning.  But Torrey’s public policy argument is 
unpersuasive.  Investigators who conduct background checks are capable of 
independently evaluating the reliability of findings, evidence, and conclusions contained 
in internal files.  Moreover, as the District Court stated, the sensitive, dangerous, and 
public-facing nature of police work favors a policy encouraging inter-agency disclosure 
of information about police officers.  Imposing liability here could dissuade police offices 
from conducting thorough, memorialized investigations into allegations of problem 
conduct. 
Torrey’s final claim is for tortious interference with prospective economic 
advantage.  For this he must show intentional and malicious interference.  See Varrallo v. 
Hammond Inc., 94 F.3d 842, 848 (3d Cir. 1996).  But he does not point to any evidence 
of anyone at the DCJ speaking negatively about him to the investigators.  His assertion 
that providing the files constituted interference is incorrect because he consented to their 
limited disclosure.  The District Court correctly concluded that this claim fails, as there is 
no other communication or conduct alleged.   
Accordingly, we affirm. 
